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Abstract 
 Fear and disgust are defensive emotions that have evolved to protect us from harm.  
While fear is thought to elicit an instinctive response to deal with immediate threat, disgust 
elicits immediate sensory rejection to avoid contamination.  One mechanism through which 
disgust and fear may be linked is via attentional bias towards threat.  Attentional bias is a 
well-established feature of anxiety disorders and is known to increase following vicarious 
fear learning. However, the contribution of vicarious learning to the development of disgust-
related attentional biases is currently unknown.  Furthermore, the influence of individual 
differences in disgust propensity and disgust sensitivity on fear and disgust responses has not 
been investigated in the context of vicarious learning.   Therefore, 53 children aged 7-9 years 
were randomly assigned to receive either fear vicarious learning or disgust vicarious learning.  
Children’s fear beliefs, disgust beliefs, avoidance preferences and attentional bias were 
measured at baseline and post-learning.  Findings demonstrated increased fear and disgust 
responding to stimuli following disgust and fear vicarious learning.  Crucially, the study 
provided the first evidence that disgust vicarious learning can create an attentional bias for 
threat in children similar to that created via fear vicarious learning.  However, there was no 
relationship between disgust propensity and sensitivity and vicariously acquired increases in 
fear, disgust and attention.  In conclusion, both fear and disgust vicarious learning can create 
attentional bias, allowing rapid detection of potentially harmful stimuli.  This effect could 
contribute to fear development and is found even in children who are not particularly high in 
disgust proneness.    
 
Keywords: disgust, fear, modelling, observational learning, vicarious learning 
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Effects of Vicarious Disgust Learning on the Development of Attentional Biases in 
Children 
Disgust may be defined as “a type of rejection response characterized by a specific 
facial expression, a desire to distance oneself from the object of disgust, a physiological 
manifestation of mild nausea, a fear of oral incorporation of the object of disgust, and a 
feeling of ‘revulsion’” (Davey, 1994a, p. 135).  It is considered an adaptive system for 
disease avoidance behavior, having evolved to protect from harm, disease, contamination and 
ingestion of dangerous or harmful substances (e.g., Cisler, Olatunji & Lohr, 2009; Curtis, De 
Barra, & Aunger, 2011; Davey, 2011; Matchett & Davey, 1991; Oaten, Stevenson, & Case, 
2009; Rozin & Fallon, 1987).  
Disgust may have much in common with fear in that they both share the same 
negative valence (threat), are considered defensive emotions, have a high ability to arouse, 
serve parallel functions, commonly co-occur, and demonstrate several comparable ecological 
characteristics (Davey, 2011). Nevertheless, cognitive responses to fear and disgust are often 
considered distinct (e.g., Cisler, Olatunji, & Lohr, 2009; Woody & Teachman, 2000), in that 
fear elicits an instinctive and immediate response to enhance sensory acquisition so as to 
efficiently deal with threatening circumstances (Gray, 1987), whereas disgust is thought to 
elicit immediate sensory rejection functioning to diminish environmental input and therefore 
avoid contamination (Rozin & Fallon, 1987; Susskind et al., 2008).  Fear responding has thus 
been considered largely automatic compared to disgust responding which may depend on 
focal attention and therefore develops slower (Anderson, Christoff, Panitz, De Rosa, & 
Gabrieli, 2003; Santos, Iglesias, Olivares, & Young, 2008).   
Research has indicated that disgust may be involved in the etiology and/or 
maintenance of anxiety disorders (see Davey & Marzillier, 2009; Olatunji, Cisler, McKay, & 
Phillips, 2010).  Like fear and anxiety, the adaptive function of disgust is likely to be to 
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protect the organism from harm (Davey, 1994a; Rozin & Fallon, 1987). In the case of fear, 
this means protection from immediate threat, and in the case of disgust, this means protection 
from the harmful effects of contamination. Hence, disgust may be as much a natural 
defensive emotion as fear but in response to a different type of threat.  However, sometimes 
disgust and fear may be simultaneously elicited by stimuli. Disgust has been found to be 
involved in a number of anxiety disorders including specific phobias such as blood-injection-
injury phobias (e.g., de Jong & Merckelbach, 1998; Tolin, Lohr, Sawchuk, & Lee, 1997), 
spider phobia (e.g., Huijding & de Jong, 2007; Sawchuk, Lohr, Westendorf, Meunier, & 
Tolin, 2002), and agoraphobia (e.g., Muris et al., 2000); as well as separation anxiety (e.g., 
Muris, Merckelbach, Schmidt, & Tierney, 1999), hypochondriasis and health anxiety (e.g., 
Davey & Bond, 2006), and fear of contamination in obsessive-compulsive disorder (e.g., 
Moretz & McKay, 2008).   
Disgust may be implicated in fear and anxiety in numerous ways.  Research has 
demonstrated that a disgust induction can lead to greater levels of fear and anxiety in both 
adults (e.g., Davey, Bickerstaffe, & MacDonald, 2006) and children (e.g., Muris, Mayer, 
Huijding, & Konings, 2008), suggesting that disgust may enhance vulnerability to these 
emotions (Muris & Merckelbach, 2001).  However, other research has shown inconsistent 
results, with Marzillier and Davey (2005) demonstrating that while an anxiety induction 
resulted in greater levels of experienced disgust in adults, there was no equivalent influence 
of disgust induction on levels of reported anxiety (see also Alaoui-Ismaili, Robin, Rada, 
Dittmar, & Vernet-Maury, 1997).  Disgust is often acquired after direct contact with a 
disgust-evoking stimulus (Fallon, Rozin, & Pliner, 1984).  A number of learning mechanisms 
have been proposed to account for the direct association between previous disease threat and 
a particular stimulus (see Curtis et al., 2011), including the ‘Garcia effect’ (conditioned taste 
aversion), in which experiencing illness following ingestion of a particular food leads to an 
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aversive association with the food (Garcia, Hankins, & Rusiniak, 1974); the law of contagion, 
in which a neutral stimulus becomes associated with disgust after touching a stimulus 
considered disgusting (Rozin, Millman, & Nemeroff, 1886); and evaluative conditioning, in 
which presentations of neutral stimuli together with highly disgusting stimuli leads to the 
neutral stimuli becoming associated with disgust (Olatunji, Forsyth, & Cherian, 2006).   
Direct learning experiences that result in an association between a previously neutral 
stimulus and disgust mirror explanations of fear acquisition via classical aversive 
conditioning (Eysenck & Rachman, 1965; Rachman & Costello, 1961).  However, direct 
conditioning is not the only pathway through which fear responses can be acquired.  
Rachman (1977) argued that fears can also be acquired indirectly through the transmission of 
verbal information or vicarious learning (‘observational learning’ or ‘modeling’).  A wealth 
of research supports the verbal information pathway, indicating that fear-related information 
can increase both fear (e.g., Field & Lawson, 2003; Field, Lawson, & Banerjee, 2008; Field 
& Schorah, 2007) and disgust (Muris et al., 2009) responses in children. Similarly, the 
transmission of disgust-related information to children can increase both their fear and 
disgust responses (Muris et al., 2008).   
The second indirect pathway is vicarious learning, in which an individual develops 
fear of a stimulus after observing someone’s fearful responses or traumatic experience with it.  
Vicarious learning is likely to be a crucial avoidance learning pathway because it is indirect 
and does not require potentially harmful direct contact with aversive stimuli before learning 
occurs (Rachman, 1977). Research has demonstrated that both adults (Golkar, Selbing, 
Flygare, Öhman, & Olsson, 2013; Olsson et al., 2016, Olsson & Phelps, 2004, and see Askew 
& Field, 2008, for a historical review) and young infants can acquire fear responses 
vicariously (e.g., Dubi, Rapee, Emerton, & Schniering, 2008; Gerull & Rapee, 2002).  
Moreover, studies with 7- to 10-year-olds demonstrate that vicarious learning can lead to 
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increases in fear-related cognitions (Askew & Field, 2007; Askew, Kessock-Philip, & Field, 
2008; Askew, Reynolds, Fielding-Smith & Field, 2016; Dunne & Askew, 2013, in press; 
Dunne, Reynolds, & Askew, 2017; Reynolds, Field, & Askew, 2015), behavioral avoidance 
(Askew & Field., 2007; Askew, Dunne, Ozdil, Reynolds, & Field, 2013; Reynolds, Field, & 
Askew, 2017) physiological responses and attentional bias (Reynolds, Field, & Askew, 2014, 
2016).  Similarly, research has also shown that everyday objects paired with disgust 
expressions were rated as more aversive by adults compared to objects paired with neutral or 
happy faces (Bayliss, Frischen, Fenske, & Tipper, 2007), and infants exposed to expressions 
of disgust towards a novel stimulus subsequently demonstrated reduced contact with that 
stimulus (Hertenstein & Campos, 2004).   
However, Muris, Mayer, Borth and Vos (2013) found that children only acquired 
disgust and fear beliefs for novel animals following verbal information from their mother, not 
from observing the mother’s nonverbal facial expressions and gestures.  One possible 
explanation may be that mothers’ nonverbal expressions were both milder and less consistent 
than verbal information.  Askew, Cakir, Poldsam and Reynolds (2014) demonstrated that 
when facial expressions were manipulated by the experimenter, disgust vicarious learning led 
to significant changes in fear beliefs and avoidance preferences with no difference between 
disgust and fear learning.  Children also rated animals as more disgusting following both fear 
and disgust vicarious learning. Thus, the research suggested a bidirectional relationship 
between fear and disgust learning in that both disgust and fear vicarious learning affect both 
fear- and disgust-related responding to stimuli.   
Disgust, Fear and Attention 
Cognitive biases may be one mechanism through which disgust and anxiety are linked 
(Davey, 2011).  One of the principal cognitive biases found in anxiety disorders is attentional 
bias towards threatening or fear-evoking stimuli in the environment (e.g., Koster, Crombez, 
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Van Damme, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2004), especially in children and adults with high 
trait anxiety (e.g., Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 
2007; for reviews see Ehrenreich & Gross, 2002; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Williams, Watts, 
MacLeod, & Mathews, 1997).  Establishing how and why attentional biases develop is 
critical to a full understanding of fear and anxiety, but relatively little is known about this. 
However, recent research with children aged 7-11 years has demonstrated that fear-related 
vicarious learning is one route via which attentional biases for novel animals can be learned 
(Reynolds et al., 2014, 2016).  Given the similarities between disgust and fear, including a 
shared association with avoiding threat and harm (Davey, 2011), and that disgust- and fear-
related vicarious learning both increase fear beliefs and avoidance preferences (Askew et al., 
2014), it is conceivable that observing someone responding to a stimulus with disgust might 
similarly lead to the development of an attentional bias for that stimulus.   
Research supporting attentional bias towards feared stimuli has sometimes been 
criticised on the grounds that while the stimuli used have been considered ‘threatening’ or 
‘fear-evoking’ by the researchers, they are in fact merely ‘negative’ or ‘arousing’ according 
to the databases and picture systems they were selected from.  Indeed, many threatening 
images from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS: Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 
2008) may actually elicit greater disgust responses than fear responses (Libkuman, Otani, 
Kern, Viger, & Novak, 2007).  As a result, some attentional bias findings may not be solely 
attributable to fear. It is also possible that there are emotion-specific attentional effects unique 
to fear and disgust (van Hooff, Devue, Vieweg, & Theeuwes, 2013).  Research has 
established attentional bias following the presentation of both disgust and fear-evoking 
stimuli in adults (e.g., Charash & McKay, 2002; Ciesielski, Armstrong, Zald, & Olatunji, 
2010; Cisler, Olatunji, Lohr, & Williams, 2009; van Hooff et al., 2013), with some research 
even demonstrating longer reaction times (RTs) and poorer accuracy for disgust stimuli than 
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for fear stimuli (e.g., Carretié, Ruiz-Padial, López-Martín & Albert, 2011; van Hooff et al., 
2013).  However, despite relatively extensive research with adults, comparable evidence with 
children is lacking.  The contribution of direct or indirect learning to these disgust-related 
biases is also still unknown.  
Disgust Propensity and Sensitivity  
Some phobias can be predicted by individual differences in disgust propensity (the 
tendency to respond with disgust to disgust-eliciting stimuli) or disgust sensitivity (the 
tendency to appraise the experience of disgust as particularly unpleasant) (van Overveld, de 
Jong, Peters, Cavanagh & Davey, 2006).  Some phobias, such as fear of blood, have been 
found to be predicted by both disgust propensity and sensitivity; while other phobias, such as 
spider phobia, are better predicted by disgust sensitivity (van Overveld et al., 2006).  Disgust 
propensity and sensitivity can lead to heightened avoidance (Hodgson & Rachman, 1974; 
Matchett & Davey, 1991), which in turn may contribute to the development or maintenance 
of phobias as a result of reduced familiarity and opportunities for latent inhibition or exposure 
(e.g., Merckelbach, de Jong, Arntz, & Schouten, 1993).  
Only a small number of studies have investigated the influence of disgust sensitivity 
and/or disgust propensity on attentional bias effects and these studies are limited to adult 
populations.  For example, work by Cisler, Olatunji, Lohr, and Williams (2009) indicated that 
automatic attentional bias towards disgust words was found only in high disgust prone 
participants, whereas automatic attentional bias towards fear was present in all participants.  
That is, adults high in disgust propensity displayed greater difficulty in attention 
disengagement from disgust targets.  Charash and McKay (2002) found that attentional bias 
towards disgust-evoking stimuli was only positively correlated with disgust sensitivity when 
the participants (adults) had been primed by a disgust story.  Therefore, the relationship 
between attentional bias and disgust propensity and/or sensitivity not only remains unclear 
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and limited to an adult population but is also yet to be investigated in the context of vicarious 
learning.    
Current Study 
Previous research (Askew et al., 2014) demonstrated changes in fear beliefs, disgust 
beliefs, and avoidance preferences in children aged 7-10 years following disgust-related 
vicarious learning.  The current study involved children of a similar age range (7-9 years) and 
investigated: 1) whether disgust vicarious learning creates a stimulus-specific attentional bias 
in children comparable with that observed following fear vicarious learning with similar-aged 
children (Reynolds et al., 2014, 2016); and 2) how individual differences in disgust 
propensity and sensitivity influence disgust vicarious learning in children.  Askew and 
colleagues (2014) did not measure disgust propensity and sensitivity but these traits are 
important in some fears (van Overveld et al., 2006). Their effects on vicarious learning are 
currently unknown but they may increase susceptibility to disgust learning in children.   
The study addressed these questions by randomly assigning a sample of children to 
one of two groups: half of the children received a fear vicarious learning paradigm in which 
pictures of novel animals were presented alone or alongside faces expressing fear (fear 
vicarious learning) and half of the children received a disgust vicarious learning paradigm in 
which pictures of novel animals were presented alone or together with faces expressing 
disgust (disgust vicarious learning).  Children’s fear beliefs, scariness ratings, disgust beliefs, 
disgustingness ratings, avoidance preferences and attentional bias for the animals were 
measured at baseline (pre-learning) and post-learning to determine whether they had 
increased as a result of vicarious learning.  Disgust sensitivity and propensity were also 
measured to establish whether they are related to fear and disgust vicarious learning.    
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Method 
Participants 
Animal phobias most commonly develop between the ages of 5 and 9 years (Öst, 
1987) which is also around the time when normal childhood developmental fears may focus 
on ghosts and animals (Bauer, 1976).  Therefore, a typically developing (nonclinical) sample 
of 7 to 9-year-olds were recruited for the current study (M = 8.25 years, SD = 9.43 months).  
Fifty-three children (22 boys, 31 girls) were recruited from a primary school in North London 
(n = 24), an event held for children at a West London university, (n = 21), and a youth 
organisation in West London (n = 8).  Participants were divided into two groups of 26 and 27 
participants.  Group sizes were comparable to previous vicarious learning research with 
children in this age group (e.g., Reynolds, Field, & Askew, 2015).  Parental consent was 
required for children to participate, and all children were informed that they could leave the 
experiment at any time without giving a reason.  All children provided verbal assent to 
participate.  The study was approved by the Middlesex University Psychology Research 
Ethics Committee.   
Materials 
Animal and face stimuli. Two Australian marsupials, a quokka and a cuscus, were 
used as the paired animals during vicarious learning.  These animals were chosen due to their 
novelty to children residing in the UK and have an established track record of being used in 
similar studies (e.g., Askew & Field, 2007; Reynolds et al., 2014, 2015).  During the 
vicarious learning procedure, three pictures of each of the animals (346 × 444 pixels) were 
presented with either fearful, disgust or no faces (of the same size).  The fearful and disgust 
faces (10 of each; 5 male, 5 female) were taken from the NimStim Face Stimulus Set 
(Tottenham et al., 2009). Tottenham and colleagues (2009) demonstrated that untrained 
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participants accurately identified the facial expressions, with high intra-participant agreement 
across two testing sessions.  
Disgust Propensity and Sensitivity Scale (DPSS-R). The DPSS-R (van Overveld et 
al., 2006) is a self-report measure consisting of eight items assessing disgust propensity (the 
frequency of experiencing disgust) and eight items assessing disgust sensitivity (the 
perceived harmful consequences and emotional impact of experiencing disgust).  Children 
were required to rate their agreement with each item on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = never to 5 
= always). Cronbach’s alphas were .66 for the Disgust Propensity scale and .73 for the 
Disgust Sensitivity Scale.   
Fear Beliefs Questionnaires (FBQ). The FBQ (Field & Lawson, 2003) is a self-
report assessment of children’s fear cognitions towards the two animals.  Example questions 
include ‘Would you be scared if you saw a quokka/cuscus?’ and ‘Would you be happy to 
have a quokka/cuscus for a pet?’  The two-animal version consists of eight items for each 
animal (16 in total) and children are required to respond on a 5-point Likert scale ranging 
from 0 to 4 (0 = no, not at all, 4 = yes, definitely).  For each item, a picture of the animal is 
displayed in the centre of the screen with the question above and the choice of responses 
below.  Internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha) for the questionnaire was satisfactory: at pre-
learning, .67 (quokka) and .69 (cuscus); and post-learning, .80 (quokka) and .80 (cuscus).   
Fear Visual Analogue Scale (Fear VAS).  In addition to the FBQ, how scary 
children believed the animals were (‘scariness rating’) was measured using a fear visual 
analogue scale.  The Fear VAS consisted of a continuous horizontal line, 100mm in length, 
displayed on the screen, anchored by Not at All Scary at one end of the continuum and 
Extremely Scary at the other.  Above the line was a picture of the animal in question.  
Children were required to use the mouse to mark on the line the point that they felt best 
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represented how scary they felt each animal was and this produced a score between 0 and 100 
with higher scores indicating higher fear of the animal.    
Disgust Beliefs Questionnaire (DBQ). The DBQ is a modified (by Askew et al., 
2014) version of Muris et al.’s (2008) self-report assessment used to measure children’s 
disgust beliefs.  Questions were modified so that they targeted the two animals.  Example 
questions included ‘Would you carefully wash your hands if you had touched a 
quokka/cuscus?’ and ‘Would you hold your nose if you were close to a quokka/cuscus?’  As 
with the FBQ, a picture of the animal was displayed in the centre of the screen during each 
question with the question above and responses below.  The questionnaire consists of eight 
items for each animal (16 in total) and children responded on a 5-point Likert scale ranging 
from 0 (no, not at all) to 4 (yes, definitely).  Internal consistency was high: at pre-
learning, .76 (quokka) and .81 (cuscus); and post-learning, 86 (quokka) and .87 (cuscus).  
Disgust Visual Analogue Scale (Disgust VAS).  The disgust VAS was used as a 
measure of how disgusting children felt the animals were.  The format of the Disgust VAS 
was identical to the Fear VAS with the exception that children were required to state how 
disgusting they felt the animals were. Therefore, the extreme limits of the scale were Not at 
all disgusting (0) and Extremely disgusting (100).   
Nature reserve task (NRT). The NRT (Field & Storksen-Coulson, 2007) was used to 
measure children’s approach-avoidance preferences.  Children were presented with a 
rectangular board (measuring 45cm x 68cm) embellished with green felt and pipe-cleaner 
trees positioned in the corners to depict a nature reserve.  A picture of a quokka or cuscus was 
placed at one end of the board.  Children were asked to imagine that a Lego figure 
represented themselves, and to place the figure on the nature reserve where they would feel 
comfortable in relation to the animal.  The distance from the animal to the figure was 
measured and taken as an indication of children’s avoidance preferences for the animals.  
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Dot probe task.  To assess children’s attentional bias towards the animals, RTs were 
taken during an adapted version of a pictorial dot probe task (Bradley, Mogg, White, Groom, 
and de Bono, 1999, see also Reynolds et al., 2014, 2016) which commenced with a fixation 
cross appearing on the computer screen for 500ms.  A picture of the quokka beside a picture 
of the cuscus were then briefly presented on the screen, one on the left and one on the right.  
Pictures remained on the screen for 500ms before disappearing to reveal a probe (either : 
or ..) in the location that one of the animals had occupied. Children were required to locate 
the probe as quickly as possible by pressing the ‘Z’ on the keyboard to indicate a : probe and 
the ‘M’ on the keyboard to indicate a .. probe.  The probe remained on the screen until a 
response had been made.  The procedure began with 16 practice trials with unrelated stimuli. 
The dot probe task itself then commenced.  Two different pictures of a cuscus and two 
different pictures of a quokka were used, therefore making four different pairs of pictures.  
The position of each picture on the left or right side of the screen was counterbalanced for 
each picture pair, and therefore each picture pair appeared twice, with the position of the 
pictures being reversed.  Each combination of each picture pair was repeated with the two 
probes (either : or ..) appearing equally on the left or right side of the screen.  Finally, each 
trial was presented twice.  Therefore, there were an equal number of congruent and 
incongruent trials for each animal, and each child was presented with a total of 64 test trials.  
RTs and accuracy for detecting the probe were automatically recorded in E-Prime.   
Procedure 
The experiment was predominantly an automated procedure, written in E-prime 2.0 
by the first author, and lasted approximately 20 minutes.  Regardless of the place of 
recruitment, all children completed the experiment in a quiet room that was free from 
distractions.  The researcher remained with the child throughout the entire experiment.  
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Pre-learning measures. Children first completed the automated DPSS-R, followed 
by the FBQ, DBQ, Fear VAS and Disgust VAS.  After completion of the questionnaires, 
children completed the NRT followed by the dot-probe task.   
Vicarious learning. Next, children were randomly allocated to one of two groups.  
Half the children (n = 27) received fear vicarious learning, and the remaining children (n = 
26) received disgust vicarious learning.  The procedure for all children was identical, only the 
emotion expressed by the faces differed (fear or disgust depending on condition).  Children 
were presented with instructions stating “You will now watch a photograph slideshow.  This 
will show you some photographs of a quokka or a cuscus.  Sometimes it will also show you a 
photograph of a person’s reaction to the animal.”  The procedure then consisted of 20 picture-
picture pairing trials: 10 negative pairing trials and 10 unpaired control trials. Each of the 10 
negative pairing trials consisted of pictures of one animal (quokka or cuscus) presented 
together with a negative face displaying either fear (fear vicarious learning group) or disgust 
(disgust vicarious learning group). Unpaired trials consisted of 10 pictures of the second 
animal (cuscus or quokka) presented alone on the screen.  Unpaired (no face) trials were 
chosen for the control condition rather than neutral face pairings because children might have 
learned that animals were non-threatening if they saw them together with neutral emotional 
faces and this would not have been an appropriate control.  Trials were presented in random 
order with the animal always appearing on the left side of the screen, and the face (or a blank 
space for the unpaired animal) on the right side of screen.  A single 2s trial consisted of the 
animal presented alone on the screen for 1s and then for a further 1s together with the face.  
The inter-trial interval varied randomly between 2s and 4s.  The procedure was 
counterbalanced to ensure that half the children in each group saw cuscuses paired with 
negative faces and the quokka unpaired, and the other children in the group saw quokkas 
paired with negative faces and the cuscus unpaired.   
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Post-Learning. Following vicarious learning, children completed the FBQ, DBQ, 
Fear VAS, Disgust VAS, NRT and dot-probe task a second time to determine whether there 
had been changes in measures as a result of vicarious learning.   
Debrief. Children were verbally debriefed at the end of the experiment and given the 
opportunity to ask any questions. They were also required to complete age-appropriate 
worksheets about the quokka and cuscus giving correct information about the animals.  
Data Analysis 
Chi-square and t-test analyses were carried out to ensure there were no differences in 
pre-learning characteristics of the participants in the fear group compared to the disgust 
group.  Next, three-way 2(time: pre-learning vs. post-learning) × 2(pairing type: negative 
paired vs. unpaired) × 2(group: fear vs disgust vicarious learning) mixed ANOVAs were 
carried out on the dependent variables (fear beliefs, scariness ratings, disgust beliefs, 
disgustingness ratings, and avoidance preferences) to investigate changes in these measures 
over time, before and after fear or disgust vicarious learning, for the negative paired animal 
compared to the unpaired animal.  Initially, these analyses also included age (months) and 
gender; however, no significant effects were found and therefore age and gender were 
excluded from all further analyses.  
 Three-way interactions were critical for determining whether the effect of vicarious 
learning on children’s fear responses was significantly different in the fear and disgust 
vicarious learning groups.  Therefore, it would be necessary to break down significant 
interactions using simple effects analyses to establish whether learning effects were greater 
for fear or disgust vicarious learning. Given, that statistical nonsignificance would not be 
sufficient alone to indicate no difference between fear and disgust learning groups, 
interpretation of nonsignificant three-way interactions was supported by calculating effect 
sizes and Bayes factors.  In contrast to standard F-values and p-values, Bayes factors can be 
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calculated to determine whether there is support for the null hypotheses that vicarious 
learning effects were no different for the disgust and fear vicarious learning groups. Bayes 
factors quantify the probability of the observed data under the alternative hypothesis relative 
to the null hypothesis. For example, a Bayes factor of 2 indicates the data are twice as likely 
under the alternative hypothesis than the null hypothesis.  A Bayes factor of less than 1 
indicates that the null hypothesis is more probable than the alternative hypothesis, whereas a 
value greater than 1 indicates that the alternative hypothesis is more probable. Values of 
around 1 indicate data insensitivity.  Where three-way interactions tested the hypothesis that 
there were group differences, Bayes factors were calculated for the inclusion of the three-way 
interaction in the model compared to when the interaction was not included using JASP 
(JASP Team, 2018) and default ANOVA priors. There is good evidence for the applicability 
of this methodology and priors (Rouder, Engelhardt, McCabe, and Morey, 2016; Rouder, 
Morey, Speckman, and Province, 2012; Rouder, Morey, Verhagen, Swagman, and 
Wagenmakers, 2017; Wagenmakers et al., 2018).  
 Several analyses were carried out on the dot probe reaction time data.  Initially, all 
incorrect responses were excluded as well as RTs less than 200ms, which were considered so 
short as to be guesses (see also Britton et al., 2013; Kim, Kim & Kim, 2016; Miloff, Savva, & 
Carlbring, 2015; Reynolds et al., 2014, 2016).  Log RTs were used to adjust for large outliers 
(see Ratcliff, 1993).  In order to investigate changes in reaction times due to vicarious 
learning, a three-way 2(time: pre-learning vs. post-learning) × 2(pairing type: negative paired 
vs. unpaired) × 2(group: disgust vs fear vicarious learning) mixed ANOVA was performed 
on log RTs for correct responses. However, in attentional bias studies, reaction times are 
generally analysed at a single time point to determine whether there is evidence of attentional 
bias at that time. In keeping with this, two separate 2(pairing type: negative paired vs. 
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unpaired) × 2(group: disgust vs fear vicarious learning) mixed ANOVAs were also 
performed on log RTs at pre-learning and post-learning.  
 Finally, correlations were conducted between changes in all fear and disgust measures 
for the fear and disgust-paired animals, to investigate relationships between the variables. 
This was followed by correlations between disgust propensity/sensitivity and changes in all 
fear and disgust measures for the fear and disgust-paired animals, to explore any relationship 
between disgust proneness and fear or disgust vicarious learning.  
Results 
Child Characteristics Pre-Learning 
Initial analyses confirmed no significant group differences in gender (fear group: 10 
males, 17 females; disgust group: 12 males, 14 females), χ2 (1, N = 53) = 0.45, p = .50 or age 
(fear group: M = 98.74 months, SD = 9.75, disgust group: M = 99.23 months, SD = 9.28), 
t(51) = -.19, p = .85, d = 0.05.  Additionally, there were no significant differences between 
males and females on disgust sensitivity, t(51) = 1.62, p = .11, d = 0.43 (males: M = 12.09, 
SD = 6.89, females: M = 9.55, SD = 4.57), or propensity, t(51) = 0.22, p = .83, d = 0.06 
(males: M = 12.86, SD = 5.90, females: M = 12.55, SD = 4.55).   
Fear Responses 
FBQ. Mean fear belief scores pre-learning and post-learning for the negative paired 
and unpaired animals following both fear and disgust vicarious learning are displayed in 
Figure 1a.  The graph demonstrates an increase in fear beliefs for the negative paired animal 
compared to the unpaired animal following both types of vicarious learning.   
The mixed ANOVA performed on average fear belief scores for the two animals 
revealed significant main effects of time, F(1, 51) = 4.27, p = .04, η2p = .08 (95% CI 
[.00, .24]), and pairing type F(1, 51) = 7.20, p = .01, η2p = .12 (95% CI [.01, .29]), but not of 
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group.  The crucial time × pairing type interaction was significant, F(1, 51) = 11.76, p = .001, 
η2p = .19 (95% CI [.03, .36]), indicating significant increases in fear beliefs over time for 
negatively paired animals compared to unpaired animals (see Figure 1a).  However, the three-
way time × pairing type × group interaction was not significant, F(1, 51) = 1.47, p = .23, η2p 
= .03 (95% CI [.00, .16]), BF10 = 0.428 (± 1.89%), showing that vicarious learning effects 
were no different in the disgust and fear vicarious learning groups.  This suggests that 
negative vicarious learning significantly increased fear beliefs compared to the unpaired 
animal regardless of emotional face type. Nonsignificance does not necessarily indicate no 
difference between the fear and disgust vicarious learning groups; however, the relatively 
small effect size here does suggest that power is unlikely to explain this result.  In addition, a 
Bayes factor of 0.428 was calculated for the three-way time × pairing type × group 
interaction compared to a model without this interaction (null model), indicating that the 
observed data were 2.34 times more likely under the null hypothesis than the alternative.  
This suggests that the type of vicarious learning children received (i.e., the group variable) 
did not moderate the effect of the time × pairing type interaction on fear beliefs, supporting 
the conclusion that the type of vicarious learning was not important here. However, Bayes 
factors of less than 3 show only relatively weak evidence and might therefore be better 
understood as an indication of insufficient sensitivity in the data to distinguish between the 
two options (Dienes, 2014; Wagenmakers et al., 2018).  
Fear VAS. How scary children felt the animals were was measured using the fear 
visual analogue scale (Fear VAS).  Figure 1b shows that following fear vicarious learning, 
how scary children felt the animals were increased for fear-paired animals and decreased for 
unpaired animals.  However, in the disgust vicarious learning group, the scariness ratings 
increased for disgust-paired animals, but remained relatively unchanged for unpaired animals.  
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Mixed ANOVA revealed no significant main effect of time or group, but a significant 
main effect of pairing type F(1, 51) = 6.66, p = .01, η2p = .12 (95% CI [.01, .28]).  The critical 
time × pairing type interaction was also significant, F(1, 51) = 5.04, p = .03, η2p = .09 (95% 
CI [.00, .25]), showing that children’s scariness ratings increased significantly for negatively 
paired animals compared to unpaired animals.  The time × pairing type × group interaction 
was not significant, F(1, 51) = 1.66, p = .20, η2p = .03 (95% CI [.00, .17]), BF10 = 0.456 (± 
1.26%), indicating no difference in learning effects for fear compared to disgust vicarious 
learning. The effect size for this interaction was small and the Bayes factor comparing the 
inclusion and exclusion of the time × pairing type × group interaction in the model indicated 
that the data were 2.19 times more likely under the null hypothesis (without the three-way 
interaction) than under the alternative hypothesis (with the three-way interaction). However, 
this was not quite high enough to establish unequivocal evidence for the null.  Therefore, 
overall, we can say that the results showed negative vicarious learning increased how scary 
children felt the animals were, with no evidence that effects for fear and disgust vicarious 
learning were different.  
Disgust Responses 
Disgust beliefs. Figure 2a shows the mean disgust belief scores for the negative 
paired and unpaired animals before and after vicarious learning, showing increases in disgust 
beliefs for negative paired animals following both fear and disgust vicarious learning, and 
decreases in disgust beliefs for the unpaired animal. 
Mixed ANOVA showed no significant main effects of time, pairing type, or group.  
However, the key time × pairing type interaction was significant, F(1, 51) = 6.56, p = .01, η2p 
= .11 (95% CI [.00, .28]) indicating that disgust beliefs significantly increased over time for 
negative paired animals compared to unpaired animals.  This effect of vicarious learning was 
no different for the fear vicarious learning and disgust vicarious learning groups, as indicated 
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by a nonsignificant time × pairing type × group interaction, F(1, 51) = 0.09, p = .77, η2p 
= .002 (95% CI [.00, .07]), BF10 = 0.274 (± 2.72%). In further support of this finding, the 
Bayes factor indicated that the data were 3.65 times more likely under the null hypothesis 
than the alternative.  This represents moderate evidence (Wagenmakers et al., 2018) that 
vicarious learning effects, demonstrated by the significant pairing × time interaction, were not 
moderated by the type of vicarious learning children received (group variable).  Overall then, 
the results showed vicarious learning of disgust beliefs and evidence that this effect was the 
same for emotional disgust and fear faces.  
Disgust VAS. Mixed ANOVA found significant main effects of time, F(1, 51) = 8.36, 
p = .006, η2p = .14 (95% CI [.01, .31]), and pairing type, F(1, 51) = 7.49, p = .009, η2p = .13 
(95% CI [.01, .30]), but not of group.  The time × pairing type, F(1, 51) = 0.76, p = .38, η2p 
= .02 (95% CI [.00, .13]), and time × pairing type × group interactions, F(1, 51) =  0.06, p 
= .81, η2p = .001 (95% CI [.00, .05]), BF10 = 0.263 (±3.66%), were also nonsignificant. 
Therefore, there were no significant changes in how disgusting children felt the animals were 
for fear- and disgust-paired animals compared to unpaired animals.  There was no difference 
between groups, confirmed by the Bayes Factor indicating the data were 3.80 times more 
probable under the null hypothesis than the alternative.  Figure 2b suggests that although 
disgust increased for negatively-paired animals after vicarious learning, disgust also 
increased for the unpaired animal, particularly in the disgust vicarious learning group.   
Avoidance Preferences 
The mean distance children placed their figure from the negative paired and unpaired 
animals in the nature reserve task at each time point is displayed in Figure 3.  The graph 
shows that children’s avoidance increased for negative paired animals and decreased for 
unpaired animals from pre-learning to post-learning. This was the case for both groups but 
was especially pronounced in the disgust vicarious learning group.  
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Mixed ANOVA performed on distance scores revealed a significant main effect of 
pairing type, F(1, 51) = 9.89, p = .003, η2p = .16 (95% CI [.02, .34]), but not time or group.  
The critical time × pairing type interaction was significant, F(1, 51) = 9.50, p = .003, η2p = .16 
(95% CI [0.02, 0.33]).  Therefore, avoidance preferences significantly increased from pre-
learning to post-learning for negatively paired animals compared to unpaired animals.  This 
vicarious learning effect was no different for fear- and disgust-paired animals, indicated by a 
nonsignificant time × pairing type × group interaction, F(1, 51) = 1.84, p = .18, η2p = .04 
(95% CI [.00, .17]), BF10 = 0.421 (± 4.05%). The Bayes factor showed that the observed data 
were 2.38 times more likely under the null hypothesis than the alternative.  Therefore, 
overall, there was evidence that both fear and disgust vicarious learning increased children’s 
avoidance preferences, with no evidence that one type of learning was more effective than the 
other.  
Attentional Bias 
Four children’s data were not used because they did not follow the instructions.  For 
the fear vicarious learning group, the percentage of incorrect responses for the negative 
paired animal pre- and post-learning were 2.25%, and 1.62% respectively and 1.44% and 
2.00% for the unpaired animal.  In the disgust vicarious learning group, the percentage of 
incorrect responses for the negative paired animal pre- and post-learning were 2.25% and 
2.88% respectively and 2.31% and 2.56% for the unpaired animal.  A three-way 2(time: pre-
learning vs. post-learning) × 2(pairing type: negative paired vs. unpaired) × 2(group: disgust 
vs fear vicarious learning) mixed ANOVA performed on incorrect responses found no 
significant main effects or interactions.   
Table 1 displays the dot probe RTs and log transformed RTs before and after learning 
for negative paired and unpaired animals in each learning group.  The means show that 
children had shorter RTs for both negative paired and unpaired animals following both fear 
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and disgust vicarious learning, compared to pre-learning RTs. This was confirmed by the 
three-way mixed ANOVA analysis on correct responses showing significant main effects of 
time, F(1, 47) = 32.51, p < .001, η2p = .41 (95% CI [.19, .56]) and pairing type, F(1, 47) = 
4.65, p = .036, η2p = .09 (95% CI [.00, .11]) but a nonsignificant main effect of group.  The 
crucial time × pairing type interaction was significant, F(1, 47) = 6.06, p = .018, η2p = .11 
(95% CI [.00, .29]).  Therefore, post-learning compared to pre-learning, RTs were 
significantly shorter for the negative paired animal compared to the unpaired animal.  This 
vicarious learning effect on RTs was no different in the two groups, indicated by a 
nonsignificant time × pairing type × group interaction, F(1, 47) = 0.41, p = .53, η2p = .009 
(95% CI [.00, .12]), BF10 = 0.299 (± 0.86%), with very low effect size.  In addition, the Bayes 
factor comparing the model with and without inclusion of the three-way interaction indicated 
that the data were 3.34 times more probable under the null hypothesis than the alternative.  
This represents moderate evidence that the type of vicarious learning did not influence levels 
of changes in reaction times due to vicarious learning. Thus, overall the analysis showed a 
significant decrease in reaction times for animals after children had seen them in a negative 
vicarious learning procedure, with evidence that this effect was no different for fear and 
disgust vicarious learning.  
Further analyses were also conducted pre-learning and post-learning to investigate 
attentional bias at each time point.  The pre-learning mixed ANOVA revealed a 
nonsignificant effect of group and the more theoretically important pairing type effect, F(1, 
47) < 0.01 p = .96, η2p < .001 (95% CI [.00, .003]), indicating no evidence of attentional bias 
and negligible effect size. There was also a nonsignificant pairing type × group interaction, 
F(1, 47) = 0.35, p = .56, η2p = .007 (95% CI [.00, .12]), BF10 = 0.239 (± 6.4%).  The Bayes 
factor comparing inclusion of the pairing type × group interaction to a model without the 
interaction (null) indicated the data were 4.18 times more likely under the null hypothesis 
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than the alternative; evidence that there was no difference in attentional bias before vicarious 
learning. Therefore, at baseline, there was no evidence of attentional bias, and this was the 
same for children in both the fear and disgust vicarious learning groups.  
Post-learning results showed no significant effect of group but a significant main 
effect of pairing type, F(1, 47) = 6.89 p = .01, η2p = .13 (95% CI [.01, .31]).  That is, 
regardless of whether children received fear or disgust vicarious learning, log RTs were 
significantly faster for the negative paired animal compared to the unpaired animal (see Table 
1), even allowing for multiple tests performed on the data.  However, the pairing type × 
group interaction was nonsignificant, F(1, 47) = 0.13, p = .72, η2p = .003 (95% CI [.00, .09]), 
BF10 = 0.30 (± 0.47%), which suggests no group differences in attentional bias. The Bayes 
factor supported this, showing that the data were 3.33 time more likely under the null than the 
alternative hypothesis.  Overall, this means that children showed a significant post-vicarious 
learning attentional bias for negative-paired animals compared to unpaired animals.  
Evidence indicated that there was no difference in attentional bias for children who had seen 
fear faces during vicarious learning compared to children who saw disgust faces.   
Correlations Between Variables 
Fear and disgust measures. All correlations between change over time scores for the 
fear and disgust-paired animals are presented in Table 2.  There was a significant negative 
correlation between changes in how scary children felt the animals were and changes in RTs 
for fear-paired animals, r(25) = -.48, p = .01, showing that as scariness increased, RTs were 
faster for fear-paired animals.  There was also a significant positive correlation between 
changes in avoidance preferences and changes in fear beliefs for fear-paired animals, r(27) 
= .62, p < .001; as fear beliefs for fear-paired animals increased, so did avoidance 
preferences. For disgust-paired animals, there was a significant correlation between how 
disgusting children felt the animals were and how scary they felt the animals were, r(26) 
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= .46, p = .02: as disgustingness ratings increased, scariness ratings also increased.  All 
remaining correlations were nonsignificant (see Table 2).  
Disgust propensity and sensitivity. Overall, scores on the disgust propensity scale 
ranged from 0 to 24 (M = 12.68, SD = 5.10) and scores on the disgust sensitivity scale ranged 
from 0 to 27 (M = 10.60, SD = 5.73).  For children in the fear vicarious learning group, scores 
on the disgust propensity scale ranged from 2 to 24 (M = 13.85, SD = 4.94) and scores on the 
disgust sensitivity scale overall ranged from 3 to 27 (M = 10.07, SD = 4.98).  In the disgust 
vicarious learning group, scores on the disgust propensity scale ranged from 0 to 24 (M = 
11.46, SD = 5.07) and scores on the disgust sensitivity scale overall ranged from 0 to 25 (M = 
11.15, SD = 6.46).  Correlational analyses demonstrated that with the exception of the 
expected relationship between disgust propensity and disgust sensitivity (fear vicarious 
learning group: r(27) = .76, p < .001; disgust vicarious learning group: r(26) = .73, p < .001), 
all correlations for disgust propensity and sensitivity with changes in fear beliefs, disgust 
beliefs,  Fear VAS scores,  Disgust VAS scores, avoidance preferences and log transformed 
RTs were nonsignificant for both fear and disgust-paired animals.   
Discussion 
The current study presents a prospective experimental paradigm investigating changes 
to fear and disgust responses following two types of vicarious learning: fear and disgust 
vicarious learning.  While there is a growing body of research exploring the effects of fear 
vicarious learning in children (e.g., Askew et al., 2008; Askew et al., 2016; Dubi et al., 2008; 
Dunne & Askew, 2013; Gerull & Rapee, 2002; Reynolds et al., 2014, 2015), disgust 
vicarious learning in children has rarely been investigated (Askew et al., 2014).  The 
experiment replicated findings demonstrating increases in fear responses following fear 
vicarious learning (e.g., Askew & Field, 2007; Dunne & Askew, 2013; Reynolds et al., 
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2014), and research showing increases in disgust responses following fear vicarious learning 
(Askew et al., 2014).  The results also confirmed Askew et al.’s (2014) findings that disgust 
vicarious learning significantly increases (1) fear cognitions (FBQ) and how scary children 
felt the animals were (Fear VAS); (2) disgust cognitions (DBQ); and (3) avoidance 
preferences (NRT).  Therefore, experimental support was provided that learning via someone 
else’s disgust responses can increase not only fear responses (Rachman 1978), but also 
disgust responses (Rozin & Fallon, 1987) for stimuli. Both fear and disgust vicarious learning 
led to changes in two of the three fear response systems (verbal-cognitive and overt behavior) 
described by Lang (1968), and also typically used to define disgust (e.g., Woody & 
Teachman, 2000).  There was no evidence that effects found for disgust vicarious learning 
differed in magnitude to those found for fear-related vicarious learning.  
Avoidance is thought to characterise both fear and disgust (Woody & Teachman, 
2000). Therefore, it was unsurprising that children showed greater fear and disgust beliefs for 
negative paired animals and reported that, compared to unpaired animals, they would avoid 
them whether they had been paired with fearful or disgusted faces.  Results showing 
increased avoidance preferences for negatively-paired animals are also in line with theoretical 
models of disgust that suggest that disgust may contribute to the acquisition of fears and 
anxieties by facilitating avoidance in an attempt to evade disease and contamination 
(Matchett & Davey, 1991).  That is, many animal fears may be acquired through initially 
being associated with contamination or disgust-evoking characteristics, followed by cultural 
and familial learning processes that lead to avoidance aimed at preventing transmission of 
contamination and disease, and subsequently, fear acquisition (Matchett & Davey, 1991).  
Contradicting previous evidence (Askew et al., 2014), there were no significant changes in 
how disgusting children felt the animals were on the Disgust VAS for fear- and disgust-
paired animals compared to unpaired animals.  Disgustingness ratings appeared to increase 
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for all animals after (especially disgust) vicarious learning in the current study, suggesting a 
possible explanation for the apparent null finding may be that learned disgust for negative-
paired animals also generalised to unpaired control animals. Generalisation may have been 
influenced by contamination beliefs often found in disgust.  
Attentional bias 
 One of the central aims of the current study was to investigate whether disgust 
vicarious learning creates a stimulus-specific attentional bias, and whether this is comparable 
with learned biases detected following fear vicarious learning.  The findings provided a 
unique and noteworthy contribution to understanding by demonstrating that disgust-related 
vicarious learning creates attentional bias for animals.  Disgust is a known feature of many 
fears and phobias (e.g., Davey & Marzillier, 2009; Olatunji, Cisler, McKay, & Phillips, 
2010). Given that attentional biases are also a central feature of many fears and phobias (e.g., 
Koster, Crombez, Van Damme, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2004), and that it is not currently 
known how they develop, the finding that disgust-related vicarious learning increases 
attentional bias towards previously neutral stimuli provides an important contribution to the 
literature.  In addition, responses in the dot probe task are unlikely to be under as much 
conscious control as self-report measures of fear, providing further confidence that the 
findings are not merely the result of demand characteristics.  
Previous research has demonstrated attentional bias following fear vicarious learning 
(Reynolds et al., 2014, 2016) and following the presentation of disgust-evoking stimuli (e.g., 
Carretié et al., 2011; Charash & McKay, 2002; Ciesielski et al., 2010; Cisler et al., 2009; van 
Hooff et al., 2013) but this is the first indication that disgust vicarious learning can create 
attentional bias towards threat in children.  No evidence was found that RTs in the dot-probe 
task differed depending on vicarious learning type.  In fact, Bayes factors provided evidence 
that the vicarious learning with both fear and disgust models create the same levels of 
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attentional bias.  Given that attentional bias towards threat is thought to function as an early 
detection system for potential danger, the current findings corroborate previous research 
suggesting that disgust is as much a defensive emotion as is fear (e.g., Charash & McKay, 
2002).  This makes sense from an evolutionary perspective because the ability to learn 
vicariously that a particular stimulus may be harmful, based on fear or disgust responses, 
offers survival advantage compared to having to directly experience a negative event with the 
stimulus, which might be lethal.  Additionally, the ability of stimuli associated with fear and 
disgust to capture attention has adaptive advantages in that it permits rapid detection of 
potentially threatening stimuli in the environment, which can then be avoided.   
Although the current study found similar attentional bias effects for fear and disgust 
vicarious learning, it is worth mentioning that research using alternative paradigms has not 
always found comparable results when participants are presented with fear and disgust-
evoking stimuli.  Although not related to vicarious learning, Carretié and colleagues (2011), 
for example, found slower RTs and poorer accuracy following the presentation of disgust-
evoking stimuli compared to fear-evoking stimuli in a digit categorisation task.  Krusemark 
and Li (2011) argue that fear and disgust orient divergent cognitive processes in line with 
their evolutionary purposes.  That is, the attentional bias towards threat following fear-
evoking images is in line with the role fear plays in boosting information processing (e.g., 
Phelps, 2006).  On the other hand, disgust-evoking images initially suppress perceptual 
attention followed by a sensory diversion from the source of disgust, and subsequently 
minimising exposure to contamination (e.g., Rozin & Fallon, 1987).  On first glance, the 
current findings appear to contradict this argument in that attentional bias for disgust-paired 
and fear-paired animals was similar. However, fear as well as disgust increased for disgust-
paired animals, which may explain why these animals were attended to more quickly.   
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It is also worth noting that the stimuli used in earlier research exploring attentional 
bias towards feared stimuli (not in the context of vicarious learning) were often problematic 
because although they had negative valence, they were not specifically considered to be fear-
related.  The current study benefits from using established emotional face stimuli taken from 
the NimStim Face Stimulus Set (Tottenham et al., 2009). Consequently, we can be confident 
that the stimuli used in the current study accurately depicted and differentiated between fear 
and disgust, rather than merely being negative or threatening. 
Methodologically, the current study uses a now well-established (e.g., Askew & Field, 
2007; Askew et al., 2016; Dunne & Askew, 2013; Dunne et al., 2017; Newall, Watson, 
Grant, & Richardson, 2017, Reynolds et al., 2014, 2016, 2017) and fully controlled vicarious 
learning laboratory paradigm, using pre-learning baseline measures and a control (unpaired) 
animal, ensuring that changes in fear and disgust responses could only be attributed to 
vicarious learning manipulations.  The use of a pre-learning baseline dot-probe measure here 
also meant that it was possible to establish that children did not have attentional bias for 
animals at the beginning of the experiment.  Therefore, attentional bias must have been 
created by vicarious learning, corroborating findings from previous fear vicarious learning 
research that only took post-learning measures of attentional bias (e.g., Reynolds et al., 2014, 
2016).   
A potential alternative explanation for the effects is that they represent some other 
form of learning, such as evaluative conditioning, rather than vicarious learning.  That is 
animal CSs may either 1) become associated with children’s emotional response to face USs, 
or 2) negative valence may simply transfer from the US to the CS.  For example, adults 
evaluated a neutral word as disgusting after Olatunji et al. (2006) presented it together with 
negatively valenced images (of bodily mutilation).  However, research has shown that the 
faces do not need to elicit fear in children for learning to occur in the current paradigm.  
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Askew & Field (2007) asked children to rate how they felt when looking at USs in the 
procedure and they reported that the faces did not make them feel scared. This suggests that 
children are not associating the animal CS with their emotional response to a negatively 
valenced face US, but with a cognitive representation of the visual information the faces 
communicate about the animal.   
Alternatively, the lack of difference between the effects of fear and disgust vicarious 
learning may be because general negative valence or threat was directly transferred from the 
faces to the animals.  That is, fear and disgust responses were the result of neutral animals 
acquiring a negative or threat valence from the faces which then increased general threat-
related responding, including attentional bias and avoidance. However, this explanation also 
appears unlikely. Previous research has shown that devaluing the faces (US) post-vicarious 
learning, by indicating to children that the model was not as scared as they first appeared, 
decreased learned fear-related responses for animals (CS) compared to a control group 
(Reynolds, Field & Askew, 2015).  Given that there had been no additional learning directly 
involving the CS during this phase, this indicates that vicarious learning in the paradigm must 
be a form of CS-US learning in which the CS is associated with a cognitive representation of 
the US. If negative valence had been directly transferred from the US to CS during vicarious 
learning, later devaluation of the US should presumably not affect fear responses for the CS.   
To ensure vicarious learning, children were specifically instructed that the 
photographs in the vicarious learning procedure showed people reacting to the animals. Thus, 
children had been led to believe that the model in the pictures was displaying a specific 
emotional expression in response to the animal it was paired with.  It is notable that this 
procedure is different from vicarious learning procedures often used in research with adults.  
Traditionally, this research has often shown participants a model undergoing a conditioning 
procedure. For example, Berger’s (1962) adult participants observed a model apparently 
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moving their arm in response to an electric shock following a buzzer. Participants continued 
to show a galvanic skin response when the buzzer was subsequently presented alone, 
indicating a vicariously learned emotional response to the buzzer.  The use of this type of 
vicarious learning procedure would not be appropriate for young children.  Moreover, it 
would be more adaptive from an evolutionary perspective if children can learn to avoid 
specific stimuli when they see someone respond with fear or disgust to them, without them 
having to first witness the person being actually hurt by the stimulus. There are likely to be 
fewer opportunities to learn via the latter route. Accordingly, few spider phobic individuals in 
the U.K. are likely to have witnessed someone receiving a painful or lethal bite from a snake 
or spider than someone acting scared of the stimuli. In line with this, previous research with 
monkeys (e.g., Cook & Mineka, 1990) and infants (e.g., Gerull & Rapee, 2002) have 
generated vicarious learning by presenting participants with a model reacting fearfully to a 
particular stimulus and this seems a more likely route to the development of fear and phobia 
outside the laboratory.  
Individual Differences in Disgust Sensitivity and Propensity 
A further aim of the current study was to determine how individual differences in 
disgust propensity and sensitivity influence disgust vicarious learning.  The effects of such 
disgust proneness on vicarious learning are unknown but they may increase susceptibility to 
disgust learning.  However, self-reported levels of disgust propensity and disgust sensitivity 
had no relationship with attentional bias effects, or any other changes in fear and disgust 
responses.  This was unexpected because previous research has demonstrated that attentional 
bias towards disgust was only found in disgust prone participants (e.g., Cisler et al., 2009).   
The current study demonstrated attentional bias towards disgust-paired stimuli regardless of 
the level of disgust propensity or sensitivity.  Cisler and colleagues used a sample of 
undergraduate students and hence there may be age-related differences between attentional 
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bias development in the adults in that sample and the children in the current sample.  
Additionally, it is worth noting that only disgust propensity was measured by Cisler and 
colleagues, and this was measured using the Disgust Scale (Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 
1994).  The current study used the DPSS-R (van Overveld et al., 2006) and differences in 
findings may reflect differences in the measures used.  It might also be the case that disgust 
proneness across the studies differs.  In the current study, children had relatively low mean 
levels of disgust propensity (M = 12.68, SD = 5.10) and sensitivity (M = 10.60, SD = 5.73) 
and it is possible that a larger range of higher scores was reflected in Cisler et al.’s study.  
Further work would be required to explore the apparent discrepancies given the differences in 
methodology. 
Some previous research (e.g., Davey, 1994b) has revealed that females have 
significantly higher levels of disgust sensitivity than males, and that disgust sensitivity 
mediates the relationship between gender and animal fears (greater animal fears found among 
females compared to males).  The current study found no differences in disgust sensitivity or 
propensity at pre-learning for boys and girls in this age group.  Preliminary analyses also 
confirmed no influence of the gender of children (or age) on the acquisition of fear and 
disgust responses in either group.   
Previous research (e.g., Reynolds et al., 2014) failed to find a mediating effect of trait 
anxiety on vicarious fear learning despite a prediction that children high in trait anxiety 
would show greater fear responses (e.g., Field & Purkis, 2011).  Research has argued that 
higher order traits like disgust sensitivity and trait anxiety, but also negative affectivity and 
neuroticism, overlap considerably (e.g., Craske, 1997; Muris et al., 1999; Phillips, Senior, 
Fahy, & David, 1998). If disgust propensity and sensitivity are too complex to separate from 
general traits like trait anxiety, it is perhaps unsurprising that effects of disgust propensity and 
sensitivity on fear and disgust responses were not found here.  Furthermore, Muris and 
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colleagues (1999) demonstrated that when trait anxiety was controlled for, the relationship 
between disgust sensitivity and anxiety symptoms disappeared in children.  Although, they 
also demonstrated that for specific phobias, disgust sensitivity appeared to be independent of 
trait anxiety.  Future research should explore the influence of other such higher order traits 
that have been found to contribute to anxiety-based symptoms.   
Limitations 
The procedure used in the current study compared negative (fear or disgust) vicarious 
learning to a no-learning control group (the unpaired animal) involving no modelling at all.  It 
could be argued that the fear and disgust responses found post-learning were affected by the 
mere presence of a social stimulus during learning. Future research could avoid this by using 
animals paired with neutral faces in the control condition, which would ensure that the 
fear/disgust-paired and control animals would differ only in terms of the type of facial 
expression they are paired with.  However, this would potentially have the disadvantage that 
children learn from the neutral faces that the control animals are non-threatening.  
Another potential influence on the findings was that that the gaze of the face during 
vicarious learning was directed forward (portrait) rather than towards the animal (profile). It 
was considered important to use an empirically supported set of emotional facial expressions 
(the NimStim Face Stimulus Set: Tottenham et al., 2009) and these typically contain forward 
facing faces.  In order to ensure that the expression of fear is accurately conveyed, very 
specific and detailed guidelines need to be followed; for example, having the mouth slightly 
open with the corners pulled straight back and lips stretched horizontally, wide open eyes 
with raised eyebrows, and a wrinkled forehead (e.g., see Ekman & Friesen, 1975; Izard, 
1971). These facial depictions of fear are likely to be more difficult for children to identify in 
a profile photo compared to a portrait photo.  
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A final potential limitation of the current study was the inability to distinguish timings 
for attentional engagement and disengagement.  Previous research has shown greater 
difficulties to disengage in disgust compared to fear attentional biases (e.g., Cisler, Olatunji, 
Lohr, & Williams, 2009) and that disgust stimuli hold attention at much earlier stages of 
perceptual processing than fear-evoking stimuli (e.g., Carretié et al., 2011; van Hooff et al., 
2013).  Future research could make use of, for example, eye-tracking or a rapid serial visual 
presentation paradigm to investigate whether there are differences in attentional engagement 
or disengagement for stimuli following fear and disgust vicarious learning.   
Implications and Conclusions 
The ﬁndings have several notable clinical implications.  In particular, results could 
potentially inform effective prevention and intervention techniques in fear and disgust by 
providing more valuable information about learning mechanisms for clinicians, caregivers, 
and those working with children.  That is, the study highlights the importance of the role of a 
model in influencing children’s fear- and disgust-related cognitions and behavioural 
avoidance.  Indeed, recent research has demonstrated that presenting children with positive 
vicarious learning immediately following a fear-related modelling event can prevent fear 
responses from developing (e.g., Reynolds et al., 2016; Reynolds, Wasely, Dunne, & Askew, 
2017). Furthermore, the knowledge that both fear and disgust vicarious learning can create 
attentional bias towards threatening stimuli, even in children not high in disgust proneness, 
can improve clinical and theoretical understanding of the processes involved in some fears, 
which could further aid clinicians in providing effective treatments for specific fears and 
phobias. 
In summary, the current study demonstrates that, like fear vicarious learning, disgust 
vicarious learning during childhood can create attentional bias towards novel stimuli, 
allowing rapid detection of potentially harmful stimuli in the environment.  Additionally, the 
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results support previous research demonstrating an increase in fear cognitions, disgust beliefs 
and avoidance preferences following both fear and disgust vicarious learning.  Crucially, 
there was no evidence that levels of disgust and fear responses acquired via disgust vicarious 
learning were any different to those acquired via fear vicarious learning.  Furthermore, 
disgust propensity or disgust sensitivity had no influence on fear and disgust vicarious 
learning, suggesting that disgust vicarious learning can create attentional bias even in 
children who are not particularly high in disgust proneness.     
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Key Points 
• Disgust and fear may be linked via an attentional bias towards threat  
• The study explored whether fear and disgust responses and biases differ in magnitude 
following disgust vicarious learning compared to fear vicarious learning in children aged 
7-9 years 
• Results revealed that the increase in fear and disgust responding to stimuli following 
disgust vicarious learning was similar in magnitude to responding following fear 
vicarious learning, as well as demonstrating that disgust vicarious learning can create 
attentional bias towards threat that is comparable to biases created following fear 
vicarious learning 
• The findings potentially inform effective prevention and intervention techniques in fear 
and disgust by providing valuable information about learning mechanisms   
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   Dot Probe 
Group Time Pairing RTs Log RTs 
Fear Pre Negative 1251.65 (390.28) 3.08 (0.14) 
  Unpaired 1255.21 (383.40) 3.08 (0.12) 
 Post Negative 872.11 (378.39) 2.90 (0.19) 
  Unpaired 913.65 (366.66) 2.93 (0.17) 
Disgust Pre Negative 1105.98 (370.73) 3.02 (0.14) 
  Unpaired 1110.12 (437.42) 3.02 (0.15) 
 Post Negative 907.91 (409.87) 2.92 (0.20) 
  Unpaired 976.85 (415.57) 2.95 (0.18) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Mean (Standard Deviation) reaction times and log transformed reaction times for 
detecting the probe when it appeared behind the negative paired or unpaired animals at each 
time point (pre-learning and post-learning) following fear and disgust vicarious learning. 
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 Measure 1 2 3 4 5 Mean (SD) 
 
 
 
Fear 
1. FBQ -     0.35 (0.90) 
2. DBQ  .01 -    0.19 (0.80) 
3. F-VAS  .36  .18 -   11.56 (24.36) 
4. D-VAS  .19 -.09 .07 -  8.52 (25.44) 
5. NRT .62** -.19 .35  .17 - 4.56 (14.51) 
6. RTs -.16  .01 -.48* -.32 -.27 -.18 (0.18) 
       
 1. FBQ -     0.50 (0.85) 
 2. DBQ  .30 -    0.26 (0.80) 
 3. F-VAS  .27 .15 -   6.08 (26.02) 
Disgust 4. D-VAS  .23 .00    .46* -  12.27 (34.54) 
 5. NRT  .18 .26 -.21  .28 - 7.69 (16.75) 
 6. RTs -.36 .04 -.18 -.02 .03 -0.11 (0.16) 
Note: FBQ=Fear Beliefs Questionnaire, DBQ=Disgust Beliefs Questionnaire, NRT=Nature Reserve Task, RTs=Reaction Times in Dot Probe 
* p < .05, ** p <.01 
 
Table 2.  Pearson correlation coefficients for changes in FBQ, DBQ, F-VAS, D-VAS, NRT and RT scores for both fear-paired and disgust-
paired animals.
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Figure 1: (a) Mean (and SE) fear belief scores for the negative paired and unpaired 
animals at each time point (pre-learning and post-learning) following fear and disgust 
vicarious learning. (b) Mean (and SE) scores on the fear VAS for the negative paired and 
unpaired animals at each time point (pre-learning and post-learning) following fear and 
disgust vicarious learning. 
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Figure 2: (a) Mean (and SE) disgust belief scores for the negative paired and unpaired 
animals at each time point (pre-learning and post-learning) following fear and disgust 
vicarious learning. (b) Mean (and SE) scores on the disgust VAS for the negative paired and 
unpaired animals at each time point (pre-learning and post-learning) following fear and 
disgust vicarious learning. 
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Figure 3: Mean (and SE) distance (cm) that children placed themselves on the nature 
reserve task in relation to the negative paired and unpaired animals at each time point (pre-
learning and post-learning) following fear and disgust vicarious learning 
 
